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Abstract—In this paper we present a code design technique
which produces codes for syndrome coding which have better
secrecy than the best error correcting codes. Code examples are
given for the case where the number of parity bits of the code
is equal to 15. The code design technique presented is based on
extensions of the parity check matrix of a set of good equivocation
codes of shorter length. It is also shown that syndrome coding
can be implemented without the traditional syndrome look
up table, enabling any length codes to be used. An efficient
recursive method to calculate the equivocation rate for the binary
symmetric channel (BSC) and any linear binary code is also
presented. The design results show that the best equivocation
codes (BEC) that are produced have better equivocation rate
for the syndrome coding scheme compared to all previously
published codes, including the best known codes (BKC).
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was proposed by Wyner [1], and is
a physical layer model that takes the security of transmitted
information into account. In this model, Alice (transmitter),
wishes to send a secret message M to Bob (legitimate receiver)
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The wiretap channel
model is shown in Fig. 1, where the main channel (between
Alice and Bob) is an error-free channel and the eavesdropper
channel is a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a probabil-
ity of error (pe) [2]. Secrecy is measured by the equivocation
rate.
Wyner showed that the equivocation rate approaches unity to
the eavesdropper if codes are used that have length extending
to infinity, if the syndrome space is chosen to be smaller than
the Shannon entropy of the binary symmetric channel (BSC).
Chen and Vinck [3] also investigated the binary symmetric
wiretap channel, and they showed that the secrecy capacity
can be obtained by using random linear codes with syndrome
coding.
The syndrome coding scheme, whose basic idea is to convey
information in the syndromes of a code so as to increase
the communication security has been studied by several re-
searchers. For example, Rouayheb and Soljanin [4] showed
that network security can be achieved by using syndrome
coding as an additional layer to a network code. Al-Hassan,
Ahmed and Tomlinson [5] showed that the equivocation rate
can be maximised on the eavesdropper side by using a com-
bination of the technique of the McEliece cryptosystem using
Best Known Codes (BKC) coupled with syndrome coding.
Cohen and Zemor [6] analysed the information leakage of











Fig. 1: Wiretap channel Model
method to select a syndrome function in order to minimise
both the length of the transmitted vector and the information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Code design for error correcting
codes is an important and long standing topic in coding theory.
Good codes can be designed by extending the parity check
matrix of good codes as shown in [7], [8].
In this paper, we present an efficient recursive method for eval-
uating the equivocation rate of any linear, binary code when
used in syndrome coding for the Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC). In addition, we present a code design technique to
extend the binary linear [n, k] code to a [n + 1, k + 1] code
to produce best equivocation codes. We present examples for
the code where the number of parity bits of the code is equal
to 15 (m = 15) where m = n − k. The code construction
method for obtaining good equivocation codes is based on the
observation that the syndrome probability mass function of a
code extended in length is a function of the probability mass
function of the original code, and good equivocation codes
produce good extended codes. The design results for m = 15
show that these new best equivocation codes (BEC) have better
equivocation rate compared to all previously published best
error correcting codes, the best known codes (BKC) listed by
Grassl [9].
II. SYNDROME CODING SCHEME
Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel [1] is :
Cs = −pe. log2(pe)− (1− pe). log2(1− pe) (1)
which is the highest transmission rate that can be obtained
while maintaining perfect secrecy. In this model, Alice (trans-
mitter) wants to transmit a sequence of independent and uni-
formly distributed m-bit binary messages to Bob (legitimate
receiver),M [1], ...M [r]. This sequence of messages is encoded
into n-bit words C[1], ...C[r]. Bob receives the same sequence
of n-bit words C[1], ...C[r] and Eve receives the sequence of
n-bit words D[1], ...D[r] where
ICTC 2014 1570005509
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Fig. 2: Block Diagram of Syndrome Coding scheme for
(n, k, d) linear block code
D(i) = C(i) + EBSC(i), i = 1, ..., r
and EBSC(i) represents a n-bit error vector generated by
the binary symmetric channel, r is the block length. The
syndrome coding scheme uses a (n, k, d) linear block code
which guarantees to correct all error patterns of weight t,
where t = (d − 1)/2. All 2m syndromes are used to send
messages where m = n − k and not just the syndromes
corresponding to weight t or less error patterns. For any linear
block code there exist 2m distinct minimum weight error
patterns, the coset leaders, in which each pattern produces a
distinct syndrome of the total 2m syndromes. Therefore, these
error patterns can be represented in a table of 2m syndromes.
In the traditional syndrome coding, the look up table for error
patterns and syndromes is known by Alice, Bob and Eve.
For long codes a syndrome table is impractical, but it is shown
below that this look up table is unnecessary, and that the
parity check matrix H of the code is sufficient taking into
consideration the structure of H in systematic format. A block
diagram for syndrome coding for a (n, k, d) linear block code
is shown in Fig. 2.
A. Encoding Algorithm
Alice starts the encryption process in order to generate a
n-bit vector C2(i) from each m-bit message M(i) at time i
such that C2(i)×HT = M(i) as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Encoding Algorithm
Require: [G]k×n  The Generator Matrix of (n,k,d) Code
Require: [DR(i)]1×k  random, uniformly distributed vector
1: Generate [DR(i)]1×k
2: [C1(i)]1×n ← [DR(i)]1×k.[G]k×n
3: [E(i)]1×n ← [M(i)|0...0]  Generate n-bit zero padded
message
4: [C2(i)]1×n ← [C1(i)]1×n + [E(i)]1×n
5: return [C2(i)]1×n
Now, we show how to calculate the error pattern [E(i)]1×n.
Since the syndrome of any codeword is zero, any codeword
added to an error pattern will produce the same syndrome.
Hence Alice may produce the required syndrome by generat-
ing an n-bit zero padded message vector E(i), which consists
of the original message M(i) which is m-bits long followed
by k 0’s where m = n− k.
B. Decoding Algorithm
1) Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder: Bob receives the trans-









Fig. 3: Block Diagram of the BSC channel and
Eavesdropper’s Decoder
free. He recovers the original message M(i) by using the
parity check matrix of the code as shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Legitimate Receiver’s Decoder
Require: C2(i), HT  Bob using HT of (n, k, d) code
1: S(i) ← C2(i).HT  Bob computes [S(i)]1×n
2: ˆM(i) ← S(i),M(i) = ˆM(i)  Bob recovers the original
message M(i)
3: return M(i)
From Algorithm 2, we can prove that C2(i)×HT = M(i)
as follows:
S(i) = C2(i)×HT −→ S(i) = (C1(i) + E(i))×HT
S(i) = C1(i)×HT + E(i)×HT
S(i) = DR(i)×G×HT + E(i)×HT , but G.HT = 0.
So, S(i) = E(i)×HT = M(i).
The syndrome formed from E(i) × HT , because of the k
leading zeros of E(i) is simply M(i) multiplied by the identity
sub-matrix of HT which produces M(i).
2) Eavesdropper’s Decoder: The block diagram of the
BSC channel and eavesdropper’s decoder is shown in
Fig. 3. Eve receives a corrupted vector D(i) instead of the
transmitted vector [C2(i)] as a result of passing through the
BSC which adds additional errors [EBSC ]1×n:
[D(i)]1×n = [C2(i)]1×n + [EBSC(i)]1×n, Where
[EBSC(i)]1×n is a random binary error vector which
depends on the crossover probability pe of BSC. Assuming
Eve uses the same type of decoder that has been used by
Bob, the following steps explains how she gets the estimated
message ˆM(i) from the corrupted vector D(i):
Algorithm 3 Eavesdropper’s Decoder
Require: D(i), HT  Eve using HT of (n, k, d) code
1: SEve(i) ← D(i).HT  Eve computes [SEve(i)]1×n
2: ˆM(i) ← SEve(i),M(i) = ˆM(i)  Eve recovers an































































From Algorithm 3, Eve estimates ˆM(i) as follows:
SEve(i) = D(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C2(i) + EBSC(i)]×HT
SEve(i) = C2(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = [C1(i) + E(i)]×HT + EBSC(i)×HT
SEve(i) = E(i)×HT + EBSC(i)×HT = ˆM(i)
ˆM(i) = SEve(i) = M(i) + Se(i)
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRECY ACHIEVED BY
SYNDROME CODING
The secrecy realised by syndrome coding is measured by the
eavesdropper decoder output equivocation, H(M(i)|M̂(i)):
H(M(i)|M̂(i)) = H(M(i), M̂(i))−H(M̂(i))
= H(M(i))−H(M̂(i)) +H(M̂(i)|M(i))
= H(M(i))−H(M(i) + Se(i))+
H(M(i) + Se(i)|M(i))





p(Se(i)). log2 p(Se(i)) (4)
where H(Se(i)) is the entropy of Se(i). The simplifications
in equations (2) and (3) are due to M(i) being uniformly
distributed and independent of Se(i). The equivocation is
calculated after deriving the probability mass function of the
syndromes due to errors from the BSC, p(Se(i)) and is a
function of the code being used through the parity check
matrix of the code.
A. Code Representation
Any binary linear (n, k, d) code is defined by its (k × n)
generator matrix G or by its (m × n) parity check matrix
H . The best equivocation codes are constructed by designing
the parity check matrix of the code. H can be defined by
representing each column of H by an integer, bi, in the range
0 to (2n−k − 1). The binary parity check matrix of a code of
length n is defined by n.k binary integers, the first m columns





1 0 . . . 0 am0 . . . a(n−1)0
0 1 . . . 0 am1 . . . a(n−1)1
...




0 0 . . . 1 am(m−1) . . . a(n−1)(m−1)


in which 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, m ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and ai,j takes a
value of 0 or 1. Each column can be represented as a packed




j . Then the systematic format
of H can be represented as following:
H = [1,2,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
where the first m integers represent the identity matrix and
the other integers have values between 3 and 2m − 1. Usually
no integers are repeated ensuring d ≥ 3 and higher values of
d are ensured by constraining no integer is a modulo 2 sum
of any other d− 2, or smaller, number of integers.
B. Evaluation of the syndrome probability distribution
The code construction technique that produces codes with
good equivocation is based on the realisation that the syndrome
probability mass function (pmf) of a new extended code is a
function of the probability mass function of the original code
and good equivocation codes produce good extended codes.
For Eve, there are 2n possible error patterns, e(i), occur for
each transmitted vector C(i)1×n. These error patterns occur
with probability:
p(e(i)) = pew(i).(1− pe)n−w(i) (5)
where w(i) is the weight of e(i). Each error pattern results in
one of the 2m syndromes being produced.
Se(i)) = e(i)×HT (6)
As the code is linear, for each syndrome there are 2k error
patterns that produce the same syndrome and the probability











This method for evaluating the equivocation works well for
short codes (n < 40), but for the long codes it is impracticable
because it involves the evaluation of 2n error patterns. Due to
the limitation of this method, the probability distribution of the
syndromes may be determined recursively, this method leads
to reduce the number of terms from 2n to 2m as shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem : The probability mass function (pmf) of Sj for j=0
to 2m-1 can be defined as p(Sj) = β(j) where β(j) are
coefficients of the probability generating function using the
Z transform, denoted as pz(S) and pz(S) only depends on
the columns of the parity check matrix H and the probability







((1− pe) + pe.Zbi) (9)
where bi are the integers representations of the columns of
H and exponent sums of powers of Z are added modulo 2.
Proof: Any error pattern may be represented as a sum of single
bit error events: e(i) = [e1 e2 . . . en]
e(i) = [e1 0 . . . 0] + [0 e2 . . . 0] + · · ·+ [0 0 . . . en]
where ei=1 with probability pe and ei=0 with probability 1−
pe. The linearity of the syndrome coding scheme means that
the syndrome resulting from any error pattern is the linear sum
of the syndromes for each bit error position:
Se(i) = e(i)×HT = [e1 e2 . . . en]×HT (10)






























































Since the probabilities of e1, e2, . . . , en are independent, the
probability of Se(i) is the product of the probabilities of n
separate error events. By adding the coefficients of the same
powers of Z results in the coefficients, βj , the number of
terms to be reduced from 2n to 2m. If the columns of H
of the shortened code of length r are taken from i = 0 to
r − 1 and the pmf generating function of the shortened code




[(1− pe) + pe.Zbi ] (12)
pz(Sr) = [(1− pe) + pe.Zb0 ].[(1− pe) + pe.Zb1 ] . . .
.[(1− pe) + pe.Zbr−1 ]
= (1− pe)2 + pe(1− pe).Zb1 + pe(1− pe).Zb0+
pe2.Zb0⊕b1 + . . .
Now, we can extend the length of the original code from r to
r+1 by adding one column to its parity check matrix H , the





[(1−pe)+pe.Zbi ] = pz(Sr)[(1−pe)+pe.Zbr ]
(13)
Denoting the β(j) coefficients of the original code of length






and for extended code r + 1
















Adding together the coefficients of the same powers of Z in







From equation (16), it is clear that the syndrome pmf of the
new code of length r+1 is equal to the syndrome pmf of the
original code of length r weighted by 1− pe plus a permuted
syndrome pmf of the original code of length r, weighted by
pe. The permutation arises from the results of the modulo 2
additions j⊕br. This leads to the conclusion that the syndrome
pmf of the code can be obtained recursively, starting with the
generating function pz(S1), determining pz(S2) then pz(S3)
through to pz(Sn). The syndrome pmf of each (n,k,d) code
of length r is stored and the syndrome pmf for each extended
code of length r + 1 is determined using the equation (16)
which makes for a fast algorithm. It is also apparent that good
equivocation codes will also produce good equivocation codes
when extended in length.
IV. CODE DESIGN TECHNIQUE
To produce a best equivocation codes the pmf of the
syndromes should be as uniform as possible. Since the eaves-
dropper channel is a binary symmetric channel, for low values
of pe the equivocation is dominated by error patterns of low
weight. To produce best equivocation codes, we must take into
account the following observations:
1) If the error pattern has low weight, then the probability
of the error events is high. If each error pattern produces
different syndrome sums, then this makes the pmf of the
syndromes become more uniform.
2) By using the systematic format of the parity check
matrix H , the packed integers of any information bit
cannot have a weight less than d − 1, where d is the
minimum Hamming distance of the code. Otherwise the
codeword formed from that information bit alone will
have weight less than d.
3) If any column of the parity check matrix H is repeated,
a weight 2 error event will produce a zero syndrome,
that leads to a non uniform pmf of the syndrome.
The following code design algorithm shows how to extend an
[n, k] code into [n + 1, k + 1] by adding the best column to
the original parity check matrix H of the [n, k] code.
Algorithm 4 Code Design Technique
Require: pz(Sr)  syndrome pmf of (n, k)code
Require: H  systematic format of H of (n, k)code
Require: b[i]  integer sequence(columns) of H
Require: (n, k,m, pe)  code parameters and error
probability of BSC
Require: Cin  initial inequivalent codes of the highest
equivocation rate
1: Generate (br)  generating between 3 and 2m − 1
Ensure: (br) = b[i]  ensure no repeated columns
2: pz1(Sr) ← (1− pe).pz(Sr)





4: pz(Sr+1) ← pz1(Sr) + pz2(Sr)  apply equations (16)
and (17)
5: Eq ← −
2m−1∑
j=0
βr+1(j).Log2(βr+1(j))  calculate the
equivocation of [n+ 1, k + 1] code
6: EqN ← Eq/m  calculate the Normalised equivocation
7: return (br), EqN,Cout  extended inequivalent codes,






























































The steps of the algorithm can be simplified as follows:
1) Calculate the syndrome pmf of the original code (n, k)
from equation(14).
2) Represent the parity check matrix H of the (n, k) code
in the systematic format:
H = [1,2,4,. . . , 2m−1, bm, . . . , bn−1]
3) Extend H with one integer (br) by generating randomly
all possible integers between 3 and 2m − 1 with the
constraint that there are no repeated integers included in
the original H . This ensures that the minimum Hamming
distance of each extended code is at least 3.
4) Eliminate all equivalent codes and evaluate the equivoca-
tion rate for each remaining code by using equation(4).
5) Rank the inequivalent codes by their equivocation rate in
descending order, and select a best codes subset. These
codes are used as the initial input for the next extension
round.
V. RESULTS
By using the code design technique above, the best
equivocation codes have been determined for m = 15. As
a result of the large number of codes we only present here
in Table 1 codes which provide at least 80% secrecy. The
minimum Hamming distance (d) and the equivocation rate
(Eq.) for a BSC error probability of pe = 0.05 is given for
each code. The equivocation rates of the corresponding best
error correcting codes previously published, the (BKC) codes
listed by Grassl [9] with the same n and m are also given
in Table 1 (in parentheses). The results show that significant
improvements have been achieved on the equivocation rate
for the best equivocation codes compared with best known
codes.
Fig. 4 shows the equivocation rate Eq. as a function of
probability of error pe of best equivocation and best known
codes for n = 82 at different values of pe. It shows that the
equivocation rate of BECs has been increased by a large
margin compared with BKCs not only for pe = 0.05 but also
for other values of pe.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a code design technique for
obtaining best equivocation codes and also presented a method
of implementing syndrome coding without the need for a
syndrome look up table. The best equivocation codes for the
syndrome coding scheme that achieve at least 80% secrecy to
an eavesdropper using the BSC with an error probability of
0.05 are presented in Table 1. In addition, a recursive method
for the evaluation of the probability mass function of the
syndromes of a code which depends only on the columns of the
parity check matrix and the probability of error of the binary
symmetric channel has been presented. The results obtained
show that the equivocation rate of the new best equivocation
codes exceeds by a large margin the equivocation rates of the
best error correcting codes, previously published.
Fig. 4: Equivocation rate Eq. vs. pe of best equivocation
(BEC) and best known (BKC) codes for n = 82
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TABLE I: Best Equivocation Codes that achieve at least 80%
secrecy in syndrome coding for pe = 0.05
m n d Eq. Packed integer parity check matrix
15 48 5 0.804141
(0.744035)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 826 1024 2048 3879 4096 7163 7913 8192 9215 9632 10552 16384 16975 17378 17779 18843 19664 21136 21973 22578 23393 24092 24495
25144 26321 26409 26640 26663 27411 28092 28622 29302 29977 31397 31871 32395 32607
15 49 5 0.813668
(0.772691)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 16384 16975 17378 17579 18413 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 23259
23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 50 5 0.822836
(0.780014)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 9683 10365 13987 16384 16975 17378 17579 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22294
23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 25850 26321 26409 27411 28092 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 51 5 0.831624
(0.787048)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 14876 16384 16975 17378 17799 18164 18843 20207 20569
21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 52 5 0.840045
(0.793774)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 151 256 512 1024 1349 2048 3879 4096 4938 7913 8192 9215 12183 15202 16207 16384 16975 17378 17957 18843 19400 20477 20900 21021 21530
21973 22762 23393 24092 24260 25438 26077 26321 26409 27411 28092 28622 29302 29873 31199 31397 31871 32620
15 53 5 0.848118
(0.800219)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4797 5541 7031 7160 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293 18843 18960 19350
19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 54 5 0.855849
(0.806378)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3691 3879 4096 5541 6315 7031 7160 7489 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 16384 16653 16975 17378 17579 18843 18960 19350 19955
21973 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 27411 27517 28092 28133 28622 28816 30717 31397 31675 31871 32153
15 55 5 0.863253
(0.812037)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378 17799
18164 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 56 5 0.870337
(0.817515)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 57 5 0.877108
(0.822674)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 58 5 0.883542
(0.827531)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975 17378
17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 23724 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 59 5 0.889691
(0.832243)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293 18843
18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153 32484
15 60 5 0.895581
(0.836659)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 10420 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 18180 18293
18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153 32484
15 61 5 0.901181
(0.84071)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 3879 4096 4664 4797 5541 6674 7031 7160 7870 7913 8192 9215 10420 13987 14289 14371 16384 16975 17378 17579 17795 18180
18293 18843 18960 19350 19955 21973 22537 23259 23393 24092 24495 25609 25698 26321 26409 26993 27411 27570 28092 28133 28622 28816 31397 31675 31871 32153
32484
15 62 5 0.906529
(0.84471)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 235 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3879 4030 4096 4956 6743 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10638 12422 12617 13288 13767 14876 15371 16384 16975
17378 17758 17799 18164 18358 18843 20207 20569 21973 23393 23724 23855 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29163 29302 30283 31397 31651
31871 32754
15 63 5 0.911620
(0.848502)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16384 16604
16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651
31871 32754
15 64 5 0.916471
(0.852014)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254
16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397
31651 31871 32754
15 65 5 0.921080
(0.855343)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16384
16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20280 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961
31397 31651 31871 32754
15 66 5 0.925470
(0.858469)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283
30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 67 5 0.929650
(0.861375)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21522 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302
30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 68 5 0.933609
(0.873716)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10574 10627 11106 12422 12617
14876 15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21554 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622
29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 69 5 0.937373
(0.883069)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 3940 4030 4096 4956 5368 6256 6454 6564 6925 7913 8192 8508 9215 9264 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16384 16604 16975 17378 17602 17799 18164 18324 18843 20207 20569 21522 21973 22743 23393 24092 25048 25148 26321 26409 27211 27258 27411 27683 28092
28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 70 5 0.940950
(0.890594)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 14876
15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683
28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 71 5 0.944327
(0.896977)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617 13924
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411
27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 72 5 0.947533
(0.902252)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 12422 12617
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321 26409 27258 27411
27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32754
15 73 5 0.950577
(0.906807)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422 12617
14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321 26409
27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 74 5 0.953458
(0.910715)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32754
15 75 5 0.956184
(0.914168)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968 26239 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 76 5 0.958767
(0.91624)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3726 3879 4030 4096 4109 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 10636 11106
12422 12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 18889 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 26321
26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32754
15 77 4 0.961205
(0.919134)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 20682 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048 25968
26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 78 5 0.963517
(0.92183)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 13685 13924 14876 15254 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048
25968 26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 79 5 0.963696
(0.924199)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 2697 3145 3726 3879 4030 4096 4109 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7254 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 10636
11106 12422 12617 14876 15254 16082 16384 16578 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 18889 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32007 32616 32754
15 80 5 0.967762
(0.926307)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3879 4030 4096 4956 5052 5359 5368 6256 6454 6564 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 13285 13685 14876 15254 15540 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18324 18700 18843 20207 20569 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326 25048
25358 25968 26239 26321 26409 27258 27411 27683 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31871 32133 32754
15 81 5 0.969716
(0.928241)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3429 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 8797 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 15644 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18267 18324 18700 18843 18955 20207 20569 21824 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 25968 26321 26409 26764 27258 27411 27683 27992 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31703 31871 32754
15 82 5 0.971556
(0.92999)
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 126 128 256 512 1024 1914 2048 3145 3429 3879 4030 4096 4956 5359 5368 6256 6454 6861 6925 7520 7913 8192 8508 8797 9215 10627 11106 11606 12422
12617 14876 15254 15644 16082 16384 16604 16975 17378 17758 17799 18164 18267 18324 18700 18843 18955 20207 20569 21824 21973 22743 23393 24011 24092 24326
25048 25968 26321 26409 26764 27258 27411 27683 27992 28092 28622 29302 30283 30961 31397 31651 31703 31871 32709 32754
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